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ABSTRACT
Mind perception in robots has been an understudied construct in
human-robot interaction (HRI) compared to similar concepts such
as anthropomorphism and the intentional stance. In a series of
three experiments, we identify two factors that could potentially
influence mind perception and moral concern in robots: how the
robot is introduced (framing), and how the robot acts (social be-
haviour). In the first two online experiments, we show that both
framing and behaviour independently influence participants’ mind
perception. However, when we combined both variables in the fol-
lowing real-world experiment, these effects failed to replicate. We
hence identify a third factor post-hoc: the online versus real-world
nature of the interactions. After analysing potential confounds,
we tentatively suggest that mind perception is harder to influence
in real-world experiments, as manipulations are harder to isolate
compared to virtual experiments, which only provide a slice of the
interaction.
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Figure 1: A NAO robot collaborating with a user to solve the
Tower of Hanoi.
1 INTRODUCTION
Within the human-robot-interaction (HRI) community there is
growing acceptance of the idea that humans treat robots as so-
cial agents [20], apply social norms to robots [50], and, in some
circumstances, treat robots as moral agents [32]. All of these are
related to the concept of mind perception, or how much agency a
robot is seen to have [1, 21]. However, whilst the attribution of a
mind to a robot may at times be desirable [52], a mismatch between
a robot’s perceived mind and actual mind, i.e., its true capabilities,
could prove detrimental for a successful interaction [17, 27, 52].
Investigating which factors actually influence mind perception
in robots is, therefore, at the core of our research. We study two
possible contributing factors: framing (how the robot is introduced),
and social behaviour (e.g., speech and non-verbal cues provided by
the robot). Work on anthropomorphism and mind perception in
robots has largely focused on embodiment and appearance, with
less emphasis on social behaviours [5, 17, 19]. Similarly, although
the effect of framing on mind perception has been studied with vir-
tual agents [10, 53, 56], this has yet to be replicated with embodied
robots. As such, the primary goal of this research is to investi-
gate the interaction between framing and social behaviours
on mind perception of a social robot.
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Further, given the recent surge of interest in ethical robotics1
and explainable AI [4], it is also timely to ask to what extent mind
perception contributes to this debate. Considering that mind per-
ception has been linked to moral concern in robots [37], we go
beyond just looking at mind perception, and investigate if the de-
gree of moral concern attributed to robots [36] changes according
to framing and behaviour.
We first conducted two experiments on Amazon Mechanical
Turk (AMT) validating a framing manipulation (experiment 1), us-
ing an image of the robot and descriptive text, and a social behaviour
manipulation (experiment 2), using a video of the robot’s behaviour.
Then, we conducted an experimental study in the real world to
investigate the interaction between these factors. We hypothesise
that robots which are framed with higher mind perception and
present social behaviours will cause higher mind perception and
be afforded more moral standing than low-mind frame, non-social
robots. We also hypothesise that when the frame and behaviour
are in conflict (e.g., high-mind frame, non-social behaviour) the
behaviour of the robot will be more influential in determining mind
perception and moral standing. Additionally, we predict a signifi-
cant correlation between mind perception, anthropomorphism, and
moral concern.
After looking at the results, we found a surprising lack of repli-
cation between the first two experiments, and the third. We, hence,
discuss potential confounds, and, as our second contribution,
identify the nature of the interaction (real-world versus vir-
tual) as the primary source for the lack of replication.
2 RELATEDWORK
The HRI community has used various terminologies and constructs
to refer to the attribution of human-like properties to robotic agents.
Anthropomorphism is one of the most widely used terms, and refers
to the general psychological phenomenon of attributing perceived
human-like properties to non-human agents [14, 17, 57]. A related
concept is the intentional stance, which focuses on explaining oth-
ers’ behaviour with reference to their mental states [33, 43]. Finally,
mind perception, as the focus of this paper, is related to the inten-
tional stance [43, 52] and refers to the extent to which agents are
seen as possessing a mind and agency [21].
There is a general consensus that the more human-like the ro-
bot appears to be, the greater the degree of anthropomorphism
[5, 9, 15]. Several measures have been developed which target an-
thropomorphism, with one of the most popular being the Godspeed
questionnaire [6]. As such, we find it also worthwhile to investigate
how anthropomorphism relates to mind perception.
The idea of mind perception was first introduced by Gray et al.
[21]. In their seminal study, they compared 11 different agents
(including a robot) on a variety of capabilities, such as pain, desire,
or the ability to have goals. They found that mind perception could
be divided into two dimensions: agency (the perceived ability to
do things), and experience (the perceived ability to feel things).
However, whilst a robot (Kismet 2) was one of the agents used in
their initial study, many different kinds of robots exist [39], and
1See for example: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/ethics-
guidelines-trustworthy-ai
2http://www.ai.mit.edu/projects/sociable/baby-bits.html
there are still open questions as to how different properties of these
robots affect ratings of mind perception.
Social behaviour is one such factor that could potentially in-
fluence mind perception. In the context of HRI, robots may be
equipped to display a number of human-like behaviours, such as
gaze following, joint attention, back-channelling, personalisation,
feedback, and verbal and non-verbal cues [2, 8, 12, 26, 35, 54, 55].
Robot behaviour can influence perceptions of machine or human-
likeness [17, 38]. Abubshait andWiese [1] also investigate the effect
of behaviour on mind perception in virtual agents; however, focus
on the reliability of the robot as a social behaviour. More complex
social behaviours such as cheating [46] or making mistakes [34, 42]
have otherwise been studied in the context of perceived human-
likeness, with mixed findings. As such, given the complex interplay
between robot errors, human performance, and mind perception,
a baseline understanding of how social behaviours in robots influ-
ences mind perception is still needed. As there can be more variance
in the behaviour of a given autonomous social robot than in its
appearance, behaviour may be of equal or greater importance [52].
Therefore, we aim to address this gap, and investigate if and how
behaviour can affect the perception of a mind in a social robot.
A second factor which could influence mind perception in so-
cial robots is how the robot is framed. Framing refers to the prior
information a person has about the robot, such as prior expec-
tations, beliefs, or knowledge [29]. Within HRI, there is already
some research which investigates how framing a robot prior to
an interaction influences participants’ subsequent judgements and
behaviour [22, 40, 41, 47, 48, 51]. For virtual agents, several studies
have investigated how framing an agent as being controlled by a
human rather than a computer leads to greater attributions of mind
[10, 53, 56]. However, in addition to most of this research being
conducted with virtual agents, rather than robots, these studies
focus on primarily neuropsychological measures of mind percep-
tion, without validation of participants subjective experiences (but
see Caruana et al. [10] for an exception). As such, no research has
yet directly investigated the effect of framing on mind perception in
robots. Hence, we investigate how two different frames, high and
low mind, affect participant’s mind perception in HRI.
A secondary element of the Gray et al. [21] study involves the
relation of mind perception to moral concern. They showed a link
between the sub-dimensions of mind perception and perceiving
an entity as moral agent, or moral patient respectively [21]. Addi-
tionally, robots with differing embodiment and behaviour may be
afforded different levels of moral concern [32, 37]. Further, fram-
ing can influence the expansion or reduction of people’s moral
inclusiveness [30]; however, this link has yet to be explored in
HRI. In light of this discussion, we chose to also include the re-
cently proposed moral concern for robots scale [36] to investigate
the relationship between mind perception and moral concern for
robots.
3 TECHNICAL SETUP AND SCENARIO
For this research we programmed a Softbank Robotics NAOv5 robot
(naoqi v2.1.4.13) to autonomously play the Tower of Hanoi with
users. We modified the original Tower of Hanoi puzzle into a two
player game by having the human and robot take turns in making
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Figure 2: A graphic visualisation of the pipeline NAO uses.
a move. We chose to construct the interaction around the Tower
of Hanoi, as it has been used previously to study aspects of HRI
such as embodiment or (gaze) behaviour [3, 23, 49]. The interaction
is long enough to expose participants to the full range of robot
behaviours, solving it requires definitive interaction with the robot,
and, at the same time, is not too cognitively demanding to distract
from the robot.
Following the taxonomy outlined by Beer, et. al. [7], we have
classified the robot as fully autonomous, drawing the action bound-
ary at giving the user specific instructions what to do. While it was
technically impossible for NAO to pick up the disks (they are too
large) and modify the game by itself, NAO instructed participants
to carry out its moves.
The technical setup is summarized in figure 2. NAO used a video
stream from its head camera, which we manually configured, to
identify the game state. To ensure consistent recognition of the
disks, we fixed the tower to the table and added a custom posture
to NAOs posture library, to which it returned whenever it assessed
the game state. We also added a light source behind NAO to ensure
sufficient exposure and increase robustness towards changes in
ambient light. To detect the presence of a disk on one of the poles,
NAO used color thresholding of the disk’s colors in three regions
of interest, one for each pole3.
From here, NAO used breadth first tree search with pruning of
previously visited states to compute the optimal sequence of moves,
solving the game in the least number of turns. This method is run
for both the robot’s and the user’s turns, allowing NAO to give
feedback on the user’s move and display appropriate behaviours.
To create the social behaviours, we reviewed the HRI literature
identifying commonly used behaviours. Some of the most frequent
examples include gaze cues, turn-taking, non-verbal gestures, per-
sonalisation, feedback, and memory [2, 8, 12, 18, 24, 28, 35]. Based
on these, we developed one version of the robots behaviour depict-
ing a ’social’ robot, and one depicting a ’non-social’ robot, see table
1. NAO launches these behaviours at specified trigger points based
on comparisons between the observed and expected game state.
We created a set of 6 custom animations: wave, think (scratching
it’s head), nod, point left, point middle, and point right.
We then created a custom module for NAO which would run the
game and added it to the naoqi framework via a custom broker. The
module was run on a separate computer accessible via the network,
and all the processing (CV, and AI) was done there.
3Source code available at: https://github.com/usr-lab/towerofhanoi
Table 1: Differences in the Robot’s Social Behaviours
Behaviour Social Non-Social
Personalization Uses ’we’ Uses third person
Feedback Gives positive or
negative feedback
States if the action
was optimal
Verbal Phrases Variety of phrases (3
or more variations)
Only one phrase per
trigger
Gestures Pointing, Waving,
Nodding, Thinking
Pointing
Gaze Switches gaze
between participant
and game
Only looks at game
Memory Says that it really
enjoys this game
States that the user
is the 27th person to
play the game
Feedback Fre-
quency
Randomly with
33% on optimal
move, always on
sub-optimal moves
For every sub-
optimal move, and
every 5th move.
4 EXPERIMENT 1 (FRAMING VALIDATION)
4.1 Hypothesis
There will be a significant effect of framing, such that participants
who read the high mind frame will have higher attributions of mind
perception than those who read the low mind frame.
4.2 Participants
We recruited 110 participants from the online platform Amazon
Mechanical Turk (AMT). To ensure sufficient English proficiency,
we only recruited participants from countries with English as the
official language (US, Canada, UK, Australia, New Zealand). Further,
to ensure high response quality, we limited participation to workers
with a 99% approval rating and introduced attention checks prior
to and during the experiment.
Out of the 110 participants, 33 were discarded due to failing
attention checks. The remaining 77 participants (Maдe = 28.05,
SD = 12.16) were randomly assigned into two conditions: high-
mind (Maдe = 27.79, SD = 12.28), and low-mind (Maдe = 28.31,
SD = 12.20). There were no significant differences in age (F (1, 76) =
.034, p = .854) or gender (X 2(1,N = 77) = 0.21, p = .883) between
the groups.
The survey took approximately 5 minutes to complete, and par-
ticipants were compensated 0.8 USD for their time.
4.3 Material
To control for participant’s conceptions of robots when filling out
the questionnaire, we showed them a picture of a NAO robot4. This
image was then combined with a text description about the robot’s
capabilities.
To measure mind perception, we used the dimensions of mind
perception questionnaire introduced by Gray et al. [21]. However,
we modified the initial scale by replacing the original 7-point Likert
4https://www.softbankrobotics.com/emea/en/nao
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Table 2: Means and SDs Experiment 1
Condition Mean SD N M F
mind perception low-mind 2.14 0.8 39 24 14
high-mind 2.79 0.91 39 24 15
total 2.46 .91 78 48 29
scale with semantic anchors with a 5-point Likert scale ranging
from not capable at all to extremely capable. This allowed us to in-
vestigate mind perception for individual robots, rather than having
to compare two robots.
The image, description, and questionnaire were shown on a
single page and provided via the participant’s browser using a
survey constructed with UniPark survey software.
4.4 Design and Procedure
We employed a 1-way independent groups design. Ethics approval
was obtained from the Bremen International Graduate School of
Social Sciences (BIGSSS). Participants were first shown an infor-
mation sheet which detailed the procedure and informed them of
their right to withdraw at any time, after which they indicated their
consent to participate. Next, participants were shown a picture of
a NAO robot and asked four attention check questions about the
image. If any of these questions were answered incorrectly, the
survey would end without presenting the manipulation or mea-
surement to the participant. If participants answered all attention
check questions correctly, they were randomly assigned to one of
the two levels of framing.
Participants were then presented with the same picture of the
robot, but now accompanied with one of the two frames (high/low
mind) manipulated as the independent variable5. We designed both
descriptions to convey the same factual information. The dependent
variable was the modified version of the mind perception question-
naire [21]. Participants were instructed to look at the picture, read
the text below, and then fill out the mind perception questionnaire.
The order of scale items was randomized for each participant.
Next, we added a final attention check, asking about the role of
the robot as described by the frame (both frames had the same role
of the robot as a teacher). This was done to ensure that participants
had thoroughly read the description. Afterwards, participants were
asked to provide demographics.
Finally, participants were taken to a debriefing statement inform-
ing them about the two conditions of the study, the aim, and the
contact details of the experimenters should they have any questions
about the study.
4.5 Results and Discussion
After collecting the data, reliability of the overall scale was com-
puted. We excluded participants that were missing more than 20%
of their data. The reliability of the overall 16 item scale,mind percep-
tion, was α = 0.94 (N = 64 valid cases), indicating the questionnaire
is highly reliable.
5The exact manipulations are available in the supplementary material.
We then conducted an independent samples t-test to compare
mind perception in the high and low mind framing conditions.
The mean and standard deviations for each group are reported
in table 2. There was a significant difference in mind perception
between participants who viewed the high-mind frame, and those
who viewed the low-mind frame, t(76) = 3.369, p < 0.001, d =
0.763 (see figure 3a). This indicates the framing manipulation was
successful in influencing participants mind perception attributed
to the robot, with a moderate to high effect size.
5 EXPERIMENT 2 (BEHAVIOUR VALIDATION)
5.1 Hypothesis
There will be a significant effect of behaviour, such that participants
who see the video of the social robot will have higher attributions
of mind perception than those who see the video of the non-social
robot.
5.2 Participants
Participants were again recruited from AMT, with the same par-
ticipation criteria as in Experiment 1 (see Section 4.2). 232 par-
ticipants completed the survey, of which 170 failed one of the
attention checks, leaving 62 (Maдe = 38.72, SD = 11.85) eligi-
ble participants. These participants were then randomly assigned
to one of the two conditions; 33 viewed the social robot videos
(Maдe = 40.27, SD = 12.04), and 28 viewed the non-social videos
(Maдe = 36.89, SD = 11.56). There was no difference between gen-
der (X 2(1,N = 61) = .350, p = .554) or age (F (1, 59) = 1.239, p =
.270) across conditions.
The survey took approximately 5 minutes to complete, and par-
ticipants were compensated 0.8 USD for their time.
5.3 Material
For this experiment, we used videos showing NAO introducing
the Tower of Hanoi, and then playing it with the experimenter.
Each condition (social/non-social) had two videos. The first video
of the set showed NAO introducing itself and explaining the rules
of the game. The second video showed three scenes from a game
played between NAO and the experimenter6. The videos were
filmed from the perspective a participant may have during the real-
world experiment, and the scenes were designed to show all the
differences present in the two conditions. The experimenter was
not seen, aside from their hand.
Mind perception was again measured using the modified version
of the mind perception questionnaire by Gray et al. [21]. We used
the Limesurvey survey tool to host the survey.
5.4 Design and Procedure
Ethics approval for this study was obtained from the Jacobs Uni-
versity Ethics Committee. We used a similar design as in our first
experiment, but replaced the initial image participants saw when
answering the attention check questions with the first video from
the set of their assigned condition (duration 40s). We also replaced
the following image and description of the robot with the second
video of the set (duration 160s).
6Videos are available in the supplementary material.
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Figure 3: The distribution of mind perception scores in ex-
periment 1 and experiment 2. Mind perception differs sig-
nificantly (p < .01) between levels for both framing (left) and
behaviour (right).
Table 3: Results Experiment 2
behaviour Mean SD N M F
MindPerception non-social 1.79 .68 28 14 14
social 2.39 .76 34 14 19
total 2.12 .78 62 28 33
Upon entering the survey, participants were randomly assigned
to either the social or non social behaviour condition as the inde-
pendent variable. From then on, the procedure was the same as in
Experiment 1, see section 4.4.
To ensure that we did not induce any false expectations about the
robot during the experiment, the debriefing statement contained
an additional paragraph indicating that the robot’s agency may
appear different from its true capabilities. We also included a link
to Softbank Robotics’s website, should participants wish to obtain
more information.
5.5 Results and Discussion
Reliability of the mind perception score (18 items, α = .92) was high.
We again excluded participants if more than 20% of the responses
were missing.
We performed an independent samples t-test on mind perception
(t(60) = 3.2, p = .002, d = .82), comparing the social and non-
social behaviours; the results are shown in figure 3b. This suggests
the social behaviours were successful in increasing participants
attributions of mind perception, with a large effect size.
6 EXPERIMENT 3 (INTERACTION)
6.1 Hypotheses
(H1) There will be a significant effect of framing, such that partici-
pants who read the high mind frame will have higher attributions
of mind perception and moral concern than those who read the
low mind frame. (H2) There will be a significant effect of behaviour,
such that participants who interact with the social robot will have
higher attributions of mind perception and moral concern than
those who interact with the non-social robot. (H3) There will be
a significant framing by social behaviours interaction, where be-
haviour will have a stronger effect than framing onmind perception
and moral concern. That is, the difference between social and non-
social behaviours for the high mind frame will be lower than the
difference between social and non-social behaviours for the low
mind frame.
6.2 Participants
We recruited students from Uppsala University via advertisements
on notice boards across the entire university, with particular focus
on the buildings for the humanities, medicine, and psychology. This
was done to attract more people with a non-technical background.
We also advertised the experiment in lectures, and recruited partici-
pants directly by approaching them and inviting them to participate.
100 participants (Maдe = 24.36, SD = 4.55) completed the ex-
periment. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 4 con-
ditions: (1) low-mind, non-social (Maдe = 24.84, SD = 5.67),
(2) low-mind, social (Maдe = 24.67, SD = 4.46), (3) high-mind,
non-social (Maдe = 24.38, SD = 3.94), (4) high-mind, social
(Maдe = 23.84, SD = 4.07). 1 participant had to be excluded due
to technical difficulties with the robot (faulty CV pipeline), leaving
99 eligible participants. Each condition had 25 participants, with
exception of the high-mind, non-social condition, which had 24.
The experiment took approximately 25 minutes to complete,
and participants were compensated with a voucher worth approxi-
mately 5 USD for their time.
6.3 Design
Ethics approval was obtained from the Jacobs University Ethics
Committee.We employed a 2-way full factorial, independent groups
design. Our independent variables were framing (high/low mind,
see section 4), and robot behaviour (social/non-social, see section
5). The number of participants needed to detect an effect with 95%
power andα = 0.05, as recommended by Cohen [11], was calculated
a priori using G*Power Software [16]. Although moderate-large
effect sizes were found in Experiments 1 and 2, we chose to be
conservative with a moderate effect size estimation (f 2 = 0.15; [11]).
Following these par ameters, the number of participants required
to detect a medium effect size is N = 73. Given our sample size of
N = 99, our analyses should be sufficiently powered to detect a
medium to large effect.
Our dependent variables were mind perception [21], moral con-
cern [36], as well the Godspeed questionnaire [6]. Participants also
answered 3 questions regarding their familiarity with robots in
general, familiarity with the NAO robot specifically, and openness
to new technologies.
6.4 Material
For this experiment, participants interacted with the NAO robot
directly, using the Tower of Hanoi as an interaction task. NAO was
programmed as described in section 3. Additionally, we provided
a laptop that participants used to fill in the questionnaires before
and after the interaction. If additional consent was given, the entire
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experiment was video recorded from two angles, a front angle, and
a side angle.
To measure mind perception, we again used the adapted mind
perception questionnaire by Gray et al. [21]. Tomeasure the amount
of moral concern participants felt towards NAO, we used a modified
version of the Measurement of Moral Concern for Robots scale [36].
We reformulated each item to start with the phrase "I would", and
reverse coded the item, if the original started with "I wouldn’t". The
final scale had 30 items, out of which 12 were reverse coded.
Finally, all dimensions of the Godspeed questionnaire [5] were
given to participants to measure anthropomorphism of the robot.
6.5 Procedure
After entering the lab, participants were asked to sit in front of the
Tower of Hanoi opposite of NAO. Then, participants were asked
to read and sign the prepared information sheet and consent form.
This included the optional decision to have the interaction video
recorded for later analysis. Afterwards, participants were directed
to a laptop, next to the tower, where they filled in a demographic
questionnaire and answered questions about their familiarity with
robots, NAO, and openness to new technology. Following this, they
were presented with the framed description of the robot (high/low
mind). This description was shown automatically after the demo-
graphics questionnaire was completed. After reading the descrip-
tion, participants were prompted to stop filling out the question-
naire and asked to inform the experimenter, so that they could start
the game. Participants then played the game with NAO showing
one of the two sets of behaviour (non-social/social). Once the game
was completed, participants were asked to continue filling out the
questionnaire, which presented the three measures in random order.
Questions within each measure were also randomized. After com-
pleting the survey, participants were shown a debriefing statement,
thanked for their participation in the study, and given the voucher
as compensation for their time.
6.6 Results and Discussion
Before analyzing the effect of our conditions, we verified the relia-
bility of the measures. Mind Perception (N = 18, α = .92), Moral
Concern (N = 30, α = .87) and Godspeed (N = 21, α = .95) were
all found to be highly reliable. The reliability of the perceived safety
scale of the Godspeed questionnaire was low (N = 3, α = .53). We
therefore excluded this sub-scale from our final analyses.
We then proceeded to check for an effect of three potential co-
variates: age, gender, and technical background. The latter was
measured using the three questions outlined in the procedure’s
pre-test, which we tested independently. First, we checked for cor-
relation between the potential covariates and the outcomemeasures.
The only significant correlation was between gender and moral
concern (σ = −.299, p < 0.03), indicating that women showed
greater moral concern for the robot than men.
During this analysis we also noted significant correlations be-
tween the dependent variables. There was a significant correlation
between mind perception and moral concern (σ = .405, p < 0.001),
mind perception and Godspeed (σ = .527, p < .001), and Godspeed
and moral concern (σ = .601, p < .001). These findings support
our hypotheses that these three constructs are related, and further
Table 4: Results Experiment 3
behavior framing Mean SD N M F
Mind
Perception
non-social low-mind 2.15 .89 25 17 8
high-mind 2.48 .64 24 16 8
total 2.31 .79 49 33 16
social low-mind 2.47 .86 25 14 11
high-mind 2.54 .73 25 14 11
total 2.50 .79 50 28 22
total low-mind 2.31 .88 50 31 19
high-mind 2.50 .68 49 30 19
total 2.40 .79 99 61 38
Moral
Concern
non-social low-mind 5.17 .84 25 17 8
high-mind 5.18 .79 24 16 8
total 5.17 .81 49 33 16
social low-mind 5.07 .84 25 14 11
high-mind 5.09 .56 25 14 11
total 5.08 .60 50 28 22
total low-mind 5.12 .74 49 31 19
high-mind 5.13 .68 50 30 19
total 5.13 .71 99 61 38
Godspeed non-social low-mind 3.53 .85 25 17 8
high-mind 3.8 .57 24 16 8
total 3.67 .73 49 33 16
social low-mind 3.63 .61 25 14 11
high-mind 3.6 .56 25 14 11
total 3.61 .58 50 28 22
total low-mind 3.58 .73 49 31 19
high-mind 3.70 .57 50 30 19
total 3.64 .66 99 61 38
suggests using a MANOVA to account for dependencies between
these variables rather than separate ANOVAS.
Afterwards, we tested for an effect of gender between conditions
using aX 2-test; we found no significant difference (X 2(3,N = 99) =
1.356, p >> .05), which is unsurprising given our random assign-
ment of participants to conditions. As correlation is a necessary
condition for determining confounds, mediation, or moderation, we
concluded that none of the measured potential confounds affected
our experiment.
Following this, we ran a MANOVA using framing and behaviour
as independent variables, and our three measures (Mind Perception,
Moral Concern, Godspeed) as dependent variables. Contrary to our
hypotheses, we found no significant effect of either (H1) framing
(F (3, 93) = .735, p = .534, Wilkin’s Λ = .977), nor (H2) behaviour
(F (3, 93) = 1.123, p = .344, Wilkin’s Λ = .965). The (H3) interaction
between framing and behaviour was also non-significant (F (3, 93) =
.704, p = .552, Wilkin’s Λ = .978). The group means are denoted in
table 4 and visualisations for the distribution for mind perception
and moral concern can be found in figure 4.
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Figure 4: The main result of experiment 3. None of the measures differ significantly between either framing, or behaviour.
While there is no significant interaction, a trend is visible in the data for the non-social condition and different frames on
mind perception.
7 GENERAL DISCUSSION
The most unexpected finding of our research is that the manipu-
lations tested in the online experiments did not replicate in the
real world. The non-significant findings on any of the three scales
(mind perception, moral concern, and anthropomorphism) also
means that we were unable to further analyse the relationship be-
tween these constructs. The lack of replication also suggests that
there is at least one other factor at play that is confounding the
manipulations. There are two main potential sources of difference
in this experiment: population and experimental setting. As the
population factors age, gender, and technical background were as-
sessed as potential confounds during the experiment, we can rule
these out as causes; this makes the experimental setting - online vs.
real-world - the more likely cause.
The first main source of difference between the three experi-
ments is the population tested. The population in the first two
experiments was recruited from AMT; the population in the third
experiment consisted of European university students. As stated
above, we can rule out age, gender and technological background,
due to non-significant correlation with either the independent or
dependent variables. The exception here is moral concern, which
differs significantly by gender, but doesn’t differ significantly be-
tween conditions. Another possible confound between the two
could be cultural background; however, this seems unlikely due to
the large diversity of both the AMT population and the university
population. In addition, the original mind perception sub-scales
have been replicated cross culturally in a Japanese sample, suggest-
ing that mind perception is a culturally generalizable phenomenon
[25]. As such, we think that it is unlikely - though not impossible -
that differences in population are causing the difference in effect
size between experiments.
The second source of difference between the experiments comes
from the environment. For the first two experiments the robot
was embodied virtually (picture and video), whereas the final ex-
periment involved physical embodiment. Additionally, the role of
participants differed between experiments. Whilst the first two
experiments were online, and therefore involved the participants
only as observers, in the final experiment they were able to interact
with the robot directly. The duration of the experiment was also
extended from around 5 minutes in the first two experiments to
25 minutes in the third. The third experiment was performed in a
research lab, whereas the first two were carried out at a location of
the participant’s choosing.
One consequence of moving from a virtual embodiment with
participants as observers to a real-world interaction with a phys-
ically embodied robot could be change in participant’s attention.
While the focus of experiment 1 and experiment 2 was clearly on
the robot, participants in experiment 3 had to split their attention
between the robot and the game. Potentially, the focus on the task
may have distracted from the robot’s behaviours, blurring out the
differences between conditions due to lower engagement with the
robot. However, in this case we would still expect a significant
effect of framing - as frames were presented before the game could
become a distractor -, and we would expect that participants that
engage more with the robot show a larger effect on the measures.
We can use time spent playing the game as a proxy measure for
engagement. However, we do not find any significant correlation
(σ = .114, p = .236) between completion time and participant’s
ratings on mind perception, making lack of focus on the robot an
unlikely explanation.
A second possibility is that real-world interaction is a lot richer
than merely seeing a picture or video. Participants may have more
sources from which they draw when assessing the extent of the
robot’s mind in the real-world interaction, making effects harder
to isolate. This would also explain the lack of replication for the
framing manipulation, as other factors present during the interac-
tion could outweigh the effect of the frame. In addition, factors like
in-group affiliation, which aren’t present in virtual scenarios due
to the nature of the participant being an observer, may be present
in real-world interactions. More factors at play would mean that
the effect size could be lower in the real-world. If we add the type
of experiment (virtual / real-world) as another variable, we can test
the assumption that real-world interaction leads to lower effect size.
This decrease would be visible as an interaction between type of
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Figure 5: A contrast between the virtual experiment and the
real-world interaction on the mean score of mind percep-
tion split by manipulations. We can see a strong indication
for an interaction between experiment type and manipula-
tion.
experiment and manipulation. That is, we would expect the effect
of framing and behaviour on mind perception to be significantly
less in the real-world experiment than in the two pilots, where only
an image and video were used. Hence, we combined our data into
one large dataset, possible due to the non-significant interaction in
experiment 3, and performed two 2-way ANOVAs comparing both
framing and behaviour across the type of experiment (online with
picture/video versus real-world interaction).
First, we conducted an ANOVA testing the interaction between
the type of experiment (virtual / physical) and framing (high/low
mind), (F (3, 173) = 4.691, p = .004) see figure 5. We found a non-
significant interaction between the experimental conditions and
framing (p = .069), a significant main effect of framing (p = .001),
likely driven by the effect of Experiment 1, and a non-significant
main effect of the experimental condition (p = .667). However, if
the effect size in the real-world interaction is indeed small, more
power may be required (suggested N > 200), making this (post-
hoc) analysis difficult to interpret. Consequently, we recommend
a follow-up study with higher power more specifically targeted
towards comparing the virtual and real-world setting in the context
of framing.
Next, we conducted a second ANOVA comparing the type of
experiment (virtual / physical) and behaviour (social / non-social),
(F (3, 157) = 5.421, p = .001), see figure 5. The ANOVA showed a
non-significant interaction between experimental conditions and
behaviour (p = .107), a significant main effect of behaviour (p =
.002), again probably driven by Experiment 2, and a significant main
effect of the experimental condition (p = .012). The main effect of
the type of experiment could suggest that ratings of mind percep-
tion are higher for physically present robots than robots depicted
in videos; again, however, a more rigorous follow-up experiment
would be needed to determine this with certainty.
Hence, a tentative explanation for what caused the reduction
in effect size is that there may be more factors at play (such as
intergroup dynamics) in the real-world setting, than were in either
online experiment. This explanation also aligns nicely with previous
work comparing virtual and physical embodiment. While some
studies suggest that physically embodied robots lead to higher
social presence [26], elicit higher ratings of empathy [45], and lead
to greater engagement and enjoyment of the interaction [13], other
studies contradict these findings [31, 44]. In our experiment, we can
equally see that physical embodiment leads to a consistent, high
attribution of mind across conditions; however, the effect size of
framing and behaviour is larger in the virtual pilots.
An appealing explanation for this is that human’s perception of
other minds is the result of interference between different sources of
truth. In a physical interaction these factors are, as mentioned above,
harder to isolate. As we can only measure the resulting, inferred
mean, the effect size of an individual factor will be reduced. In the
virtual setting, however, the manipulation is more isolated, meaning
less factors contribute overall, and variance in the manipulation is
easier to detect.
Should interference from other, non-measured factors be the
main cause of our findings, this could also explain some of the
other contradictory findings in research on physical and virtual
embodiment. However, and this is a clear limitation of our work,
we can only tentatively suggest this explanation, as we set out
to test a different hypothesis and derived this explanation post-
mortem. Hence, we highly encourage more research testing both,
which factors contribute to outcomes like mind perception, and
what differences exist between virtual and physical interactions.
Ideally, specific factors which could potentially contribute to mind-
perception in-vivo would need to be identified and manipulated
individually. Additionally, we think that a meta-analysis on the
effect of robot behaviours could help investigate if our theory can
explain some of the conflicting findings between previous studies.
8 CONCLUSION
In summary, this paper shows evidence that mind perception is
harder to manipulate in physical experiments than in virtual ones.
Both experiment 1 and experiment 2 showed significant effects
of framing and social behaviour on mind perception, respectively.
However, these effects failed to replicate in a real-world setting. We
tentatively suggest that this is caused by virtual interactions being
more isolated, i.e., only providing a slice of the real interaction.
We hypothesize that this could explain some of the contradictory
findings in experiments between virtual and physical embodiment,
although further research is needed to claim this with certainty.
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